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AT&T MOBILITY  AND FAA OVER-PREEMPTION 
 
Jill Gross* 
 
It is no secret that pre-dispute arbitration clauses in adhesive consumer and employment 
agreements have been harshly criticized in this country in recent years.  Critics label these 
clauses, which often contain one-sided provisions, such as class arbitration waivers and 
inconvenient venue and cost-shifting provisions, as oppressive and unfair to those with inferior 
bargaining power.1   
The Supreme Court’s most recent decisions under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”)2 
have only exacerbated this ongoing debate.  These rulings have stripped the arbitrators of the 
power to construe silence in an arbitration agreement as consent to class arbitration,3 reaffirmed 
the arbitrability of federal statutory claims,4 upheld a clause in an arbitration agreement 
delegating to arbitrators the power to rule on the unconscionability of the arbitration clause,5 and 
enforced a class arbitration waiver in an arbitration agreement.6  Among other impacts, these 
decisions have effectively foreclosed the ability of consumers and employees to pursue low-dollar 
value claims, as they can no longer consolidate them in an arbitration proceeding.7   
These decisions clearly reflect the Court’s strong support of arbitration agreements.  That 
strong support does not come without a cost, however, as these decisions also severely limit the 
states’ powers to police the fairness of arbitration agreements.  In particular, the Court’s decision 
in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion8 expands the FAA preemption doctrine beyond its prior 
boundaries, signaling how far the Court is willing to go to support arbitration clauses at the 
expense of states’ rights and the values of federalism.  This article will explore the impact of 
AT&T Mobility on the preemption of state law and the concomitant impact on the balance 
                                                     
* Professor of Law, Director of Legal Skills and Director, Investor Rights Clinic, Pace Law School.   
1 See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for 
Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237 (2001); Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 133 (2004); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of 
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); David S. 
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of 
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33 (1997); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637 (1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: 
Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931 (1999).  But see Stephen J. Ware, 
The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements— With Particular Consideration of Class Actions and 
Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 264 (2006) (arguing against legislation prohibiting enforcement of adhesive pre-
dispute arbitration agreements and stating that “the general enforcement of adhesive arbitration agreements benefits 
society as a whole by reducing process costs and, in particular, benefits most consumers, employees and other adhering 
parties”). 
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2007). 
3 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l. Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
4 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012). 
5 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). 
6 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
7 See Jean Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 
723 (2012); Sarah Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent 
Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457 (2011).    
8 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1740. 
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between state and federal power in the arbitration arena.  This article argues that AT&T Mobility 
results in FAA over-preemption,9 as it unduly shifts arbitration law-making power away from the 
states, in violation of the FAA’s savings clause. 
I. THE FAA PREEMPTION DOCTRINE 
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 “to overrule the judiciary’s long-standing refusal to 
enforce agreements to arbitrate.”10  Animated by the overarching principle of contractual 
autonomy, the FAA’s primary purpose was to “require[] courts to enforce privately negotiated 
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms.”11   
The Supreme Court has interpreted the FAA to embody a strong national policy favoring 
arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.12  In the past twenty-five years, the 
Court’s FAA jurisprudence has imbued the FAA with super-status: it governs virtually every 
arbitration clause arising out of a commercial transaction,13 and its substantive provisions apply in 
both state and federal court.14  Although it is well-settled that the FAA does not create federal 
subject matter jurisdiction,15 the Court has declared repeatedly that the FAA “creates a body of 
federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the 
coverage of the Act.”16  
Another consistent holding in the Supreme Court’s FAA jurisprudence is that its primary 
substantive provision, § 2, which declares that agreements to arbitrate are “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract”17 preempting state laws that place an arbitration agreement on unequal footing from 
other contracts.18  Under the FAA preemption doctrine, § 2 preempts in federal and state court 
any state law that “actually conflicts with federal law, that is, to the extent that it ‘stands as an 
                                                     
9 I have previously argued that state courts over-preempt their own laws providing grounds to vacate arbitration 
awards.  See Jill I. Gross, Over-Preemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004). 
10 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985). 
11 Volt, 489 U.S. at 478. 
12  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (recognizing a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements”). 
13 By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate involving “transactions involving commerce.”  9 U.S.C. 
§ 2 (2010).  The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase very broadly to include any transaction that in fact involves 
interstate commerce, even if the parties did not anticipate an interstate impact.  See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 
U.S. 52 (2003) (applying FAA to debt restructuring agreements as “involving commerce”); Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (applying FAA to securities arbitrations); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995) (interpreting the reach of the FAA broadly to all transactions “involving commerce” 
and stating that “‘involving’ is broad and is indeed the functional equivalent of ‘affecting’”). 
14 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) (“The statements of the Court in Prima Paint that the 
Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the Act 
were to apply in state as well as federal courts.”). 
15 See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009); Hall Street Assoc., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 
581-82 (2008); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25 n.32. 
16 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.  The Court defined arbitrability in this context as “the 
duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate.” Id. at 25 n.32. 
17 9 U.S.C. § 2.  This latter phrase of § 2 is known as the FAA’s “savings clause.” 
18  See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008). 
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obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”19  
Thus, FAA preemption is a sub-species of “conflict preemption” known as “obstacle 
preemption.”20   
The FAA’s substantive provision, § 2, reflects a classic federalism balance.  On the one 
hand, it displaces conflicting state law.  Through FAA obstacle preemption, the Supreme Court 
has rebuffed state law-based defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements to the extent 
those defenses single out arbitration agreements for hostile treatment.21  Thus, the Court has held 
that the FAA preempts state statutes that prohibit the arbitration of a particular type of claim,22 
state statutes that invalidate arbitration agreements on grounds different than those that invalidate 
other contracts,23 and state judicial rules that display vestiges of the ancient judicial hostility to 
arbitration.24  In these situations, lower courts have had no choice but to declare arbitration 
agreements enforceable under federal law even if they might be deemed unenforceable under 
state law.25   
On the other side of the federalism balance, the savings clause of § 2 preserves for the 
states the ability to declare arbitration agreements invalid on grounds traditionally reserved for 
state law: common law contract defenses to the enforceability of any contract.  Thus, courts 
(either state courts or federal courts applying state contract law) have struck down arbitration 
                                                     
19 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 1; Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood 
& Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (preempting California 
statute requiring wage collection actions to be resolved in court). 
20 The Supreme Court has explained that it will find a state law preempted by a Congressional Act when: (1) the 
federal law expressly provides it displaces state law (“express preemption”); (2) Congress intends the federal law in an 
area to “occupy the field” (“field preemption”); (3) it is impossible for a party to comply with both the state and federal 
law (“impossibility preemption”); and (4) the challenged state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress” (“obstacle preemption”).  See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  Impossibility and obstacle 
preemption are both subcategories of conflict preemption.  Id.; see generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 
225, 228 (2000) (describing preemption categories). 
21 None of these decisions preempt a state arbitration law—laws that primarily address arbitration procedures 
and award enforcement, and almost uniformly further a pro-arbitration policy.  Rather, the Court has preempted state 
laws on non-arbitration matters that contain “lingering anti-arbitration sentiment.”  Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. 
Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 195 (2002). 
22  See Preston, 552 U.S. 346, 356-57 (preempting California law granting exclusive jurisdiction to Labor 
Commissioner to decide disputes arising under the Talent Agencies Act); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 8  
(1984) (preempting provision of the California Franchise Investment Law that required judicial, not arbitral, resolution 
of claims brought under the statute). 
23 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996) (preempting Montana statute requiring 
specific type of notice in contract containing arbitration clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 
292-93 (1995) (preempting Alabama statute invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts). 
24 See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012) (preempting West Virginia Supreme Court 
rule voiding as against public policy pre-dispute arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts with respect to 
negligence claims); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (preempting Florida judicial rule 
that precluded arbitrators from deciding the legality of a an allegedly usurious contract containing an arbitration 
agreement); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (preempting New York law precluding 
arbitrators from awarding punitive damages).  In contrast, the FAA does not preempt a state arbitration statute that 
merely dictates the order of proceedings with respect to an arbitration and related third-party litigation, but does not 
regulate the viability or scope of the arbitration agreement itself. See Volt, 489 U.S. at 471.     
25 Exhibit A to this article charts all of the Supreme Court’s FAA preemption decisions and describes the state 
law at issue, the Court’s preemption holding, and the outcome of the case. 
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agreements on contract law grounds such as lack of mutual assent,26 unconscionability,27 an 
illusory agreement,28 or violating the contract’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.29  
As long as the ground for revocation of the arbitration clause is a ground applicable to all 
contracts, and not just arbitration agreements, the states are free to apply their law, free of FAA 
preemption.  But what happens where courts apply a generally applicable contract defense, such 
as unconscionability, in a manner that arguably de facto disfavors arbitration? 
II. THE AT&T MOBILITY  DECISION 
The Court faced such a question in its 2010-11 term.  In AT&T Mobility, LLC v. 
Concepcion,30 the Court held for the seventh time that the FAA preempted a state law, this time a 
state law that on its face was not anti-arbitration but was being applied by lower courts in a 
manner that de facto disfavored arbitration.  The decision, while noteworthy for its condemnation 
of class arbitration, confirms the Court’s intent to severely circumscribe the ability of state law to 
regulate the fairness of arbitration, and to that extent is consistent with its previous FAA 
jurisprudence.  
In AT&T Mobility, the Court ruled that the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank 
rule, which “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as 
unconscionable.”31  In its consumer cellular phone service contracts, AT&T Mobility, LLC 
(“AT&T”) included a pre-dispute arbitration agreement which, inter alia, prohibited plaintiffs 
from bringing class action arbitrations, instead requiring claims to be arbitrated on an individual 
basis.  In 2006, the Concepcions sued AT&T in district court, alleging that AT&T’s practice of 
charging sales tax on a phone advertised as “free” was fraudulent.32  In December 2006, after the 
Concepcions filed their claim, AT&T revised the arbitration agreement to provide that AT&T 
would pay a customer $7,500 if an arbitrator found in favor of a California customer on the merits 
of a customer dispute, and awarded more than the last AT&T settlement offer.33  Two years later, 
after the Concepcions’ case was consolidated with a putative class action alleging, inter alia, 
identical claims of false advertising and fraud, AT&T moved to compel arbitration under the 
revised agreement.34   
The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement under the savings clause of 
FAA § 2.  The court concluded that the class action waiver of the arbitration agreement was 
unconscionable because it had a deterrent effect on class actions and the efficient resolution of 
third party claims.35  After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, on an interlocutory appeal, the district 
                                                     
26 See, e.g., Phillips v. Mazyck, 643 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 2007); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 
2002). 
27 See, e.g., State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 2011); Rivera 
v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 259 P.3d 803 (N.M. 2011). 
28 See, e.g., Penn v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, 269 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2001) (applying Indiana law). 
29 See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying Restatement of 
Contracts and South Carolina contract law). 
30 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
31 Id. at 1746. 
32 See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (Concepcion was consolidated with Laster in September 2006). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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court’s conclusion that the class-arbitration waiver was unconscionable and that the FAA did not 
preempt the Discover Bank rule,36 AT&T sought review in the Supreme Court.  
On April 27, 2011, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Scalia 
(joined by Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), held that the FAA preempts 
California’s Discover Bank interpretation of the state’s unconscionability rule.  The Court 
concluded that the Discover Bank rule created a different law of unconscionability for class action 
waivers in adhesive arbitration contracts.37  Thus, the FAA preempts the rule as it singles out 
arbitration clauses for suspect treatment.38   
The Court rejected the Concepcions’ argument that the Court should defer to the 
California Supreme Court’s analysis of its own unconscionability doctrine and instead use an 
objective determination on whether or not the rule is “tantamount to a rule of non-enforceability 
of arbitration agreements.”39  The majority was persuaded by research which demonstrated that 
state courts had become more likely to find an arbitration agreement unconscionable as opposed 
to other contracts.40  The Court also noted that although California’s “rule does not require class-
wide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post,” thus defeating 
the purposes of the FAA.41 
                                                     
36 Id. at 853-69. 
37 The Supreme Court noted that, under California law, a court may refuse to enforce a contract that it finds “‘to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made,’” or it may “‘limit the application of any unconscionable clause.’” 
AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE  § 1670.5(a) (West 1985)) (“A finding of 
unconscionability requires a ‘procedural’ and a ‘substantive’ element, the former focusing on ‘oppression’ or ‘surprise’ 
due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on ‘overly harsh’ or ‘one-sided’ results.”) (citations omitted).  In Discover 
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. 1740, the California 
Supreme Court applied this unconscionability law to class-action waivers in arbitration agreements and held: 
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in 
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small 
amounts of damages, and when it is alleged that the party with the superior 
bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers 
of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then . . . the waiver 
becomes in practice the exemption of the party “from responsibility for [its] 
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.”  Under these 
circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and 
should not be enforced.   
Id. at 1110 (citation omitted). 
 
38AT&T identified three principles from Discover Bank that it contended courts applied differently to arbitration 
agreements than to other contracts: (1) the effect on third parties; (2) the timing of the unconscionability decisions; and 
(3) the shock the conscience standard. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09–893). 
39 Id. at 39. 
40 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1747. 
41 Id. at 1750.  The Court discussed three characteristics of class arbitration that it concluded defeat the purposes 
of the FAA and hinder the flexible party-driven process of arbitration: (1) sacrifice of informality and speed; (2) a 
requisite increase in procedural formality; and (3) an increase in risks to defendants in the lack of judicial review.  Id. at 
1751-52.  Although the plurality expressly included the procedural expediency of arbitration as one of the FAA’s 
purposes with which the Discover Bank rule interferes, the dissent referred to the Court’s Dean Witter decision in 
which it specifically “reject[s] the suggestion that the overriding goal of the [FAA] was to promote the expeditious 
resolution of claims.”  Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 
(1985)). 
30 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion was fueled by a singular distrust of class arbitration - a 
distrust that also appeared in the Court’s 2010 decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corporation.42  In contrast, the AT&T Mobility dissent claimed that class 
proceedings are necessary to protect against small-value claims falling through the cracks of the 
legal system.43  Justice Scalia responded to the dissent’s concern by stating that “[s]tates cannot 
require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated 
reasons.”44  Thus, the Court went so far as to characterize class arbitration as not arbitration at all 
within the meaning of the FAA, but a process that alters the fundamental attributes of arbitration.   
Justice Thomas “reluctantly join[ed]” the majority, but wrote “separately to explain how 
[he] would find [a] limit” on contract defenses permitted by FAA § 2.45  In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Thomas reasoned that the savings clause of the FAA permits exceptions to the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements only for defenses that “relate[] to the making of the 
[arbitration] agreement.”46  Because the Discover Bank rule did not relate to the formation of the 
arbitration agreement within the meaning of FAA §§ 2 and 4, Justice Thomas concluded that it 
was preempted by the FAA.  While Justice Thomas’ interpretation of FAA § 2 differed from prior 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and was not briefed or advocated by the parties, his vote was 
necessary for the 5-4 reversal.   
In the AT&T Mobility dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor 
and Kagan) argued that California’s Discover Bank rule “represents the ‘application of a more 
general [unconscionability] principle.’”47  Because it is a rule of state law applicable to all 
contracts and not just arbitration agreements, it falls within the savings clause and the FAA 
should not preempt it.48  Additionally, the dissent criticized the plurality’s conclusion that class 
arbitration is lacking the “fundamental attribute[s]” of arbitration within the meaning of the FAA.  
Justice Breyer opined that barring class arbitration and forcing lower courts to enforce adhesive 
class arbitration waivers would “have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims.”49   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
42 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
43 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
44 Id. at 1753 (majority opinion). 
45 Id. at 1753-54 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Justice Thomas felt compelled to articulate his reading of the savings 
clause because, in past preemption cases, he dissented based on his view, first articulated in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. 
v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284-97 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting), that the FAA does not apply in state courts.  Since 
this case came up through the federal courts, that basis of dissent did not apply. 
46 AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct.  at 1754-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2010)). 
47 Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 564 (Cal. 2007)). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 1761. Justice Breyer asked the Concepcion majority, “What rational lawyer would have signed on to 
represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”  Id. (citing Carnegie 
v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“…only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”)).  In doing so, 
he cited an appellate court which recognized previously the “realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million 
individual suits, but zero individual suits,...” Id. 
31 
Finally, the dissent expressed deep concern for the impact of the decision on principles of 
federalism:  
Through [the savings clause], Congress reiterated a basic federal idea 
that has long informed the nature of this Nation’s laws.  We have often 
expressed this idea in opinions that set forth presumptions.  Here, 
recognition of that federalist ideal, embodied in specific language in 
this particular statute, should lead us to uphold California’s law, not 
strike it down.  We do not honor federalist principles in their breach.50 
Academic and media reaction to AT&T Mobility was swift and harsh.51  Much of the 
criticism focused on the certain death of class arbitration as a method to redress small dollar value 
claims through arbitration.52  Commentators agreed with the dissent that many consumers would 
not be able to pursue their claims, and thus vindicate their statutory rights, if they could not 
consolidate their claims with others into larger groups.53  Is AT&T Mobility such an unparalleled 
disaster - a “tsunami,” as Professor Sternlight termed it?54   
III. AT&T MOBILITY  AND FAA PREEMPTION 
In some ways, AT&T Mobility is logically consistent with the Court’s previous cases 
imposing FAA preemption.  As in most of the Court’s previous preemption cases (except 
Mastrobuono),55 the Court’s decision resulted in the imposition of arbitration on an unwilling 
disputant.  This decision, like the previous ones, preempted a state law that did not involve 
arbitration procedures.  And, like in its previous preemption opinions, the Court elevated 
principles of contractual autonomy over state law consumer protection regulations. 
                                                     
50 Id. at 1762 (citation omitted). 
51 See, e.g., Jean Sternlight, supra note 7; S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration ‘Change the Nature’ of 
Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791928; Sarah Cole, Continuing the Discussion of the AT&T v. Concepcion Decision: 
Implications for the Future, ADR Prof Blog, Apr. 27, 2011, http://www.indisputably.org/?p=2312 (“It would appear 
that the era of class arbitration is over before it really ever began – unless Congress can be persuaded to amend the 
FAA to permit class arbitration, at least in cases involving low value claims, where consumers are unlikely to have 
practical recourse to a remedy through traditional bilateral arbitration.”); Marcia Coyle, Divided Justices Back 
Mandatory Arbitration for Consumer Complaints, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, Apr. 28, 2011, available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202491963074&slreturn=1 (quoting lawyer for Concepcions as stating “’[t]he 
decision will make it harder for people with civil rights, labor, consumer and other kinds of claims that stem from 
corporate wrongdoing to join together to obtain their rightful compensation’”).  
52 Sternlight, supra note 7, at 704 (“It is highly ironic but no less distressing that a case with a name meaning 
“conception” should come to signify death for the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs.”); Sarah Cole, On Babies 
and Bathwater, supra note 7, at 464 (“most pressing issue in consumer arbitration, in the wake of recent Supreme Court 
decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for consumers with low value claims”).  
53 See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: From Unconscionability to Vindication of Rights, 
SCOTUSBLOG, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-
unconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (“The AT&T ruling is the real game-changer for 
class action litigation, as it permits most of the companies that touch consumers’ day-to-day lives to place themselves 
beyond the reach of aggregate litigation by simply incorporating class waiver language into their standard-form 
contracts.”). 
54 See Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 7. 
55 See Exhibit A. 
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Indeed, the Court’s very first FAA preemption case, Southland v Keating,56 preempted a 
California state law that, as interpreted by California’s high court, provided a ground for the 
revocation of any contract - just as in AT&T Mobility.  In Southland, several 7-Eleven franchisees 
sued franchisor Southland in California state court alleging various common law claims, as well 
as claims arising under the California Franchise Investment Law (CFIL).57  After the claims were 
consolidated with other franchisees’ similar claims, Southland invoked the arbitration clause in 
the franchise agreements and moved to compel arbitration of the action.58  Ultimately, the issue of 
the arbitrability of the CFIL claims made its way to the California Supreme Court, which held 
that they were not arbitrable in light of § 31512 of the statute – a provision that voided any 
“condition, stipulation or provision purporting to bind [a franchisee] to waive compliance with 
any provision of [the CFIL].”59   
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the FAA preempted § 
31512 of the CFIL.  Dismissing the dissent’s contention that the savings clause preserves this 
defense to arbitration for the states, the Court concluded that § 31512 was not a ground for the 
revocation of any contract (and thus not within the scope of the savings clause), but was a 
“ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in contracts subject to the 
[CFIL].”60  The Court reached this conclusion even though § 31512 on its face did not mention 
arbitration and presumably applied to many different kinds of agreements, not just arbitration 
agreements.  When considered through the lens of Southland’s preemption of a seemingly 
contract-neutral state law, AT&T Mobility paves no new ground. 
In some ways, however, this case appears to stretch the FAA preemption doctrine beyond 
its previous scope, as it reflects the Court’s first preemption of a traditional common law defense 
to the enforcement of any contract (here, unconscionability).61  The Court found latent anti-
arbitration animus in California’s unconscionability defense in the way that California courts 
applied the Discover Bank doctrine to arbitration agreements.62  At the core of previous 
preemption decisions was not a traditional common law defense to contracts that easily associated 
with the savings clause.63  Those decisions involved the preemption of a state statute or rule that 
was enacted to remove forum choice from contracting parties (Southland, Preston, Allied-Bruce 
Terminix, and Perry) or was patently anti-arbitration (Cassarotto and Mastrobuono (and post-
AT&T Mobility, Marmet)). 
Another striking difference from prior preemption cases is the AT&T Mobility Court’s 
measures to strip arbitrators of a power – the power to conduct class arbitration proceedings 
(unless all parties expressly agreed to them).  In contrast, the Court’s previous preemption cases 
endorsed arbitrators’ broad powers to fashion procedures and remedies to suit the parties’ needs 
                                                     
56 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1984). 
57 Id. at 4. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 10 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977)). The California high court interpreted this language to 
require judicial consideration of claims arising under the law. 
60 Id. at 16 n.11. 
61 Although California codified the unconscionability doctrine (see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1979)), 
and thus AT&T Mobility involved a California statute as interpreted by California courts, unconscionability has long-
standing roots in the common law of contracts. 
62 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011). 
63 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (“[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, 
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 
2.”) (emphasis added). 
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and the dispute.64  Ironically enough, the end result in Southland, which arose out of a purported 
class action of convenience store franchisee claims, was forcing unwilling franchisees into 
arbitration, possibly using class action-type procedures.65  The end result in AT&T Mobility is 
somewhat the inverse – forcing consumers who sought class arbitration into individual, small 
claims arbitration.   
Why didn’t the Southland Court balk at sending franchisees into class arbitration?  
Possibly because the parties did not litigate the issue of the propriety of class arbitration in 
1984.66  Or was class arbitration in 1984 closer to FAA arbitration than it is in 2011?   
What was different in 1984 was that the FAA federalism see-saw still tipped towards the 
states, and the Supreme Court had just begun its expansion of the preemptive force of the FAA.  
In fact, as recently as 2009, before the Court’s “third arbitration trilogy,”67 the Court in Vaden 
stated that “[g]iven the substantive supremacy of the FAA, but the Act's nonjurisdictional cast, 
state courts have a prominent role to play as enforcers of agreements to arbitrate.”68  The third 
arbitration trilogy, and, in particular, AT&T Mobility, strips the courts of one of the only doctrines 
remaining to play that enforcer role, raising serious federalism concerns.69  Despite the Vaden 
Court’s polite nod to the states acknowledging that they have a “prominent role to play,” state 
courts have few weapons left to police the fairness of arbitration agreements.70  
IV. FAA PREEMPTION POST-AT&T MOBILITY  
Where does AT&T Mobility leave the FAA preemption doctrine?  States are now 
struggling to regulate the fairness of arbitration agreements sought to be enforced within their 
borders.  It is now crystal-clear that states cannot enact substantive statutes either expressly or 
implicitly hostile to arbitration.  States also cannot circumvent the enforceability of arbitration 
                                                     
64 See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1995) (preempting state law that 
stripped arbitrators of power to award punitive damages). 
65 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 2-3.  Interestingly, the Court noted that “as to the question whether the Federal 
Arbitration Act precludes a class action arbitration and any other issues not raised in the California courts, no decision 
by this Court would be appropriate at this time.”  Id. at 17. 
66 Id. at 17 (“as to the question whether the Federal Arbitration Act precludes a class action arbitration and any 
other issues not raised in the California courts, no decision by this Court would be appropriate at this time”). 
67 See Thomas Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-a-Center, Concepcion and the 
Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323 (2012)  (labeling Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center and AT&T 
Mobility as the third arbitration trilogy because they “represent[] a milestone in American arbitration” as they  
“aggressively expand[] the ‘revealed’ penumbra of substantive arbitration law under the Federal Arbitration Act and 
shore[] up the bulwarks of private, binding dispute resolution under standardized contracts of adhesion binding 
employees and consumers”). 
68 Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 59 (2009).  The Court reiterated this view post-AT&T Mobility in 
KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 24 (2011) (holding that, even if a lower court concludes that some claims in a 
multi-claim action are not arbitrable, court must compel arbitration of remaining claims). 
69 Professor Stipanowich points out that language in dicta in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), 
foreshadowed this preemption of unconscionability doctrine.  See Stipanowich, supra note 67, at 356 (citing Perry, 482 
U.S. at 492 n.9). 
70 See Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59. Even more disturbing is the reasoning of Justice Thomas’ concurrence.  Under his 
unprecedented and narrow reading of the savings clause, the only exceptions to §2’s enforcement of arbitration clauses 
are common law contract defenses that go to the making of the arbitration agreement, rather than all common law 
defenses to the enforcement of any contract.  If his view is adopted by other Justices in future FAA decisions, state law 
would have virtually no ability to successfully invalidate arbitration agreements.   
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agreements through administrative regulations that prefer administrative forums over arbitration 
for the resolution of disputes.  And state courts cannot create common law rules that de facto are 
hostile to arbitration, even if on their face they treat all agreements equally.  The Supreme Court’s 
FAA preemption decisions have reduced the savings clause to a largely symbolic nod to 
federalism, toothless in its application.  By over-preempting state law grounds for revocation of 
any contract, the Court has ignored federalism concerns and tipped the carefully prescribed 
balance of power away from the states, expanding the FAA even more than it had before. 
How can courts invalidate unfair arbitration agreements under the current FAA over-
preemption regime?  Some decisions emanating from states’ high courts post-AT&T Mobility 
reflect unyielding FAA preemption of state law with respect to the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements containing class action waivers.71  Likewise, Professor Sternlight’s analysis of federal 
court reaction in the six months after the case revealed that most decisions applied the AT&T 
Mobility holding rigorously, despite ample grounds for distinction from AT&T Mobility.72  
However, a few federal courts have been more willing to distinguish AT&T Mobility and 
strike down a class action waiver under the "vindicating statutory rights" doctrine.73  Under this 
doctrine, derived from the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Mitsubishi74 that “so long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, 
the [federal] statute [providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and 
deterrent function,” a disputant can argue that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable because 
an unfair aspect of the arbitration process would preclude that party from vindicating its statutory 
rights.75   
For example, in In Re American Express Merchants’ Litigation,76 a purported class action 
arising under federal antitrust laws, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reconsidered, in light of 
AT&T Mobility, its prior decisions that a class action waiver clause in a credit card agreement was 
unenforceable under the FAA77 because “enforcement of the clause would effectively preclude 
any action seeking to vindicate the [plaintiffs’] statutory rights.”78  The Court of Appeals found 
that AT&T Mobility did not alter its prior analysis, which rested on a different ground than AT&T 
                                                     
71 See, e.g., State ex rel. Richmond Am. Homes of W. Va., Inc. v. Sanders, 717 S.E.2d 909, 924 (2011) 
(upholding class action waiver in arbitration clause under AT&T Mobility but declaring clause unconscionable on other 
grounds); NAACP of Camden County. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777 , 794-95 (2011) (upholding class action 
waiver but denying motion to compel arbitration on ground that arbitration provisions lacked mutual assent). 
72 See Sternlight, supra note 7, at 708 (concluding that “most courts are rejecting all potential distinctions and are 
instead applying Concepcion broadly as a ‘get out of class actions free’ card”).  
73 See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950 (LBS) (JCF), 2011 WL 2671813 at *3 
(S.D.N.Y July 7, 2011) (refusing to reconsider its holding in at Title VII action that an arbitration clause was 
unenforceable because plaintiffs would not be able to vindicate their statutory rights absent the availability of class 
proceedings and distinguishing AT&T Mobility). 
74 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). 
75 See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (recognizing in dicta that, if a party 
showed that pursuing its statutory claims through arbitration would be prohibitively expensive, and thus it could not 
vindicate its statutory rights, a court could validly refuse to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement). 
76 See In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) (Amex III). 
77 See In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011) (Amex II); In re Am. Express 
Merchants’ Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009) (Amex I). The Court of Appeals reconsidered Amex I in light of the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
78 Amex I, 554 F.3d at 304. 
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Mobility.79  Rather, the Court of Appeals recognized, “[h]ere…our holding rests squarely on a 
‘vindication of statutory rights analysis, which is part of the federal substantive law of 
arbitrability.’”80  Because plaintiffs demonstrated through expert testimony that pursuing their 
statutory claims individually, as opposed to through class arbitration, would not be economically 
feasible, thereby “effectively depriving plaintiffs of the statutory protections of the antitrust 
laws,”81 the Second Circuit directed the district court to deny defendant’s motion to compel 
arbitration.82   
Amex III does not equalize the federalism balance because it dealt with the federal law of 
arbitrability, not the preemption of an arguably conflicting state law.83  However, states can 
distinguish AT&T Mobility on numerous grounds to limit its federalism impact.84  Courts can 
limit it to the class action waiver contract, yet still find other grounds for unconscionability of the 
arbitration clause.  Courts also can apply a contract-neutral state unconscionability doctrine to 
void a class action waiver.85 
Additionally, if a primary reason parties try to void arbitration agreements is to avoid a 
process they perceive as unfair, then states can offer secondary protection to those parties in the 
form of regulation of the process.  The Supreme Court has not ruled that a section of the FAA 
other than § 2 applies in state court or preempts conflicting state law, nor has it held that state 
arbitration law is preempted to the extent it regulates arbitration procedures.  In fact, the one time 
the Court considered and rejected an FAA preemption argument involved a state procedural law 
that governed the order of proceedings, not the viability of arbitration itself.86  Thus, states can 
still enact procedural arbitration law that can have some impact on the integrity of the process, 
and then to some extent, address the concerns of disputants seeking to avoid an arbitration 
agreement. 
State courts can also seize upon the "vindicating rights" federal law doctrine and carve 
out an exception to arbitrability under state law if a party can show some aspect of the arbitration 
contract or agreement precludes it from being able to vindicate its state statutory rights in 
arbitration.  Courts can still resuscitate the savings clause by applying relevant common law 
                                                     
79 See Amex III, 667 F.3d at 214 (“What Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not do is require that all class-action 
waivers be deemed per se enforceable.  That leaves open the question presented on this appeal: whether a mandatory 
class action waiver clause is enforceable even if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that the practical effect of 
enforcement would be to preclude their ability to bring federal antitrust claims.”). 
80 Id. at 213 (quoting Amex I, 554 F.3d at 320). 
81 Id. at 217. 
82 Id. at 219-20. Professor Sarah Cole wrote about the Second Circuit’s decision: “It would seem, then, that a 
plaintiff subject to a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement could attack that provision on the ground of 
unconscionability if it can show that bilateral arbitration would effectively preclude it from vindicating its statutory 
rights. Although this analysis must be done on a case-by-case basis, according to the Second Circuit, it certainly gives 
plaintiffs a basis for challenging a class action waiver.  American Express says that it is going to appeal the decision.”  
Sarah Cole, Class Action Waiver in Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable, INDISPUTABLY BLOG, Feb. 2, 2012, 
http://www.indisputably.org/?p=3326. 
83 The National Labor Relations Board carved out another non-state law based exception to AT&T Mobility in the 
labor and employment context, finding that federal labor law bars class action waivers in labor and employment 
contracts. See D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 at *9 (2012). 
84 Professor Sternlight lists several possible bases of distinction. See Sternlight, supra note 7, at 726-27. 
85 This option remains open to the West Virginia State Supreme Court of Appeals on remand in Marmet Health 
Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202 (2012) (On remand, the West Virginia court must consider whether, 
absent that general public policy, the arbitration clauses in Brown's case and Taylor's case are unenforceable under state 
common law principles that are not specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA). 
86 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470-79 (1989). 
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contract defenses to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.  Unless Congress amends the 
FAA to eliminate the savings clause altogether, the Supreme Court would be hard-pressed to find 
that the FAA preempts common law defenses to the enforcement of any contract.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
There seems to be little doubt that AT&T Mobility will have an adverse impact on 
consumer arbitration, as it effectively eliminates the states’ ability to preserve class arbitration as 
a procedural method of aggregating low-value claims.  In my view, the Court’s decision differs 
from its prior preemption cases in both the type of rule preempted and its respect for arbitrators’ 
powers.  These differences contribute to the resulting over-preemption of the FAA. 
Yet, despite the Court's consistent message to the states that there is no room to 
circumvent the FAA’s ironclad support of arbitration agreements, I remain hopeful that - even 
post AT&T Mobility - lower state and federal courts will find ways to counter the seemingly over-
preemptive, super-status of the FAA.  The FAA preempts only state laws, not federal laws, thus, 
federal unconscionability law may still invalidate a class arbitration waiver.  In addition, other 
federal statutes may trump the FAA, such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934’s anti-waiver 
provision, which may prevent the enforcement of a class arbitration waiver in the securities 
context.87  Finally, like the Second Circuit did in Amex III, courts can give more teeth to the 
“vindicating statutory rights” ground as the ultimate policer of the fairness of arbitration, and thus 
rebalance the allocation of power between the states and federal government in the arbitration law 
arena. 
  
                                                     
87 See Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 75 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116-18 (2012) (arguing that a class action waiver in the securities context could violate anti-
waiver provisions of federal securities laws because it would weaken investors’ ability to recover under those laws). 
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Exhibit A 
Case name Year Law at issue Preemption? Outcome 
Southland Corp. 
v. Keating 
1984 § 31512 of 
California 
Franchise 
Investment Law 
requiring judicial 
resolution of claims 
Yes, of California 
Supreme Court’s ruling 
on anti-arbitration state 
statute 
Convenience store 
franchisees must 
bring their CFIL 
claims in 
arbitration, possibly 
using class 
procedures 
Perry v. Thomas 1987 California Labor 
Law § 229 allowing 
wage collection 
actions to be 
resolved in court, 
regardless of 
arbitration 
agreement 
Yes, of California 
Supreme Court’s 
refusal under anti-arb 
state statute to compel 
arbitration of securities 
broker’s claim against 
firm for commissions 
Kidder Peabody 
could force its 
broker into 
arbitration 
Volt Information 
Sciences v. Bd. 
of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior 
Univ. 
1989  § 1281 of 
California 
Arbitration Act 
allowing stay of 
arbitration pending 
outcome of related 
litigation with third 
party 
No; affirmed California 
Court of Appeals’ 
denial of contractor’s 
motion to compel 
arbitration in favor of 
University; arbitration 
procedural rule 
Enforced CAA in 
construction 
contract; stayed 
arbitration; allowed 
litigation to proceed 
with third party 
Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson 
1995 Alabama statute 
invalidating pre-
dispute arbitration 
agreements in 
consumer contracts 
Yes, of Alabama 
Supreme Court’s 
refusal to compel 
arbitration under anti-
arbitration state statute 
Homeowners had to 
arbitrate claims 
against termite 
company 
Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson 
Lehman Hutton 
1995 New York judicial 
rule precluding 
arbitrators from 
awarding punitive 
damages 
Yes; reversed Seventh 
Circuit vacatur of 
punitive damages 
award under anti-
arbitration state judicial 
rule 
Permitted recovery 
for investors from 
completed 
arbitration 
Doctor’s Assocs. 
v. Cassarotto 
1996 Montana statute 
requiring specific 
type of notice in 
contract  
Yes; reversed Montana 
Supreme Court’s 
refusal to enforce 
PDAA in franchise 
agreement under anti-
arb state statute 
Franchisees forced 
into arbitration 
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Exhibit A - Continued 
Case name Year Law at issue Preemption? Outcome 
Buckeye 
Check 
Cashing, Inc. 
v. Cardegna 
2006 Florida judicial rule 
precluding arbitrators 
from deciding legality 
of contract containing 
arbitration agreement 
Yes; reversed Florida 
Supreme Court’s refusal 
to permit arbitrators to 
decide whether allegedly 
usurious contract was 
void ab initio for 
illegality 
Borrowers forced 
to arbitrate their 
claim of usury 
Preston v. 
Ferrer 
2008 California statute 
allowing 
administrative forum 
for claims arising 
under Talent Agencies 
Act 
Yes, reversed California 
Court of Appeals’ grant 
of stay of arbitration 
pending proceedings 
before Labor 
Commissioner under 
anti-arbitration state 
statute 
Attorney allowed 
to proceed with 
fee claim against 
Judge Alex in 
arbitration 
AT&T 
Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion 
2011 California judicial 
decision declaring 
class arbitration 
waivers 
unconscionable in 
most consumer 
agreements 
Yes, of California 
Supreme Court’s anti-
arbitration judicial rule 
interpreting state 
unconscionability statute 
Consumer forced 
to bring 
arbitration claim 
on an individual, 
not class, basis 
Marmet 
Health Care 
Ctr. v. Brown 
2012 West Virginia 
Supreme Court rule 
voiding as against 
public policy pre-
dispute arbitration 
clauses in nursing 
home contracts with 
respect to negligence 
claims 
Yes, remanding back to 
West Virginia Supreme 
Court to decide 
unconscionability of 
contract apart from anti-
arbitration public policy 
rule 
Highest state 
court forced to 
reconsider its 
own state law 
 
